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APPELLATE PRACTICE IN MISSOURI-1957*
CHAuREs V. GAsmuTT**

THE JURISDICTION OF THE SuPRE=IE CouRT

The 1957 decisions of the court again emphasize the necessity for
careful consideration, at the trial court level, of the ever present question
of appellate jurisdiction. The court found it necessary, during the year
under review, to transfer nine cases to the courts of appeals, retaining
jurisdiction in only one other case where jurisdictional questions were
raised. The rules of the supreme court require appellant, at the beginning
of his brief, to make "a concise statement of the grounds on which the
jurisdiction of the review court is invoked,"' and that rule contemplates a
statement of the jurisdictional facts. In State ex rel. State Highway
Comm'n v. Hudspeth,2 however, where the jurisdictional statement
challenged certain acts of the state highway department and argued that
the appeal involved a construction and clarification of the powers of the
commission, the court condemned that jurisdictional statement as a mere
argument, bearing no resemblance to the kind of jurisdictional treatise
called for by the rule. The court then made its own examination of the
questions involved and, holding that the highway department is not a
state officer, that title to real estate was not involved, and that the fact
that appellant is a municipal corporation does not lodge jurisdiction in the
supreme court, the case was transferred to the court of appeals.
In another case, City of Marshfield v. Haggard3 the appellate issues
involved the proper boundary line of a city street and it was the contention of appellant that the decree granted the city an easement over a part
of defendant's land by its determination of the boundary dispute. However, since defendant did not deny that the city is entiled to an easement
for street purposes, title to the fee was not involved in the jurisdictional

*This Article contains a discussion of selected 1957 Missouri court decisions.
**Attorney, Kansas City; LL.B., Kansas City School of Law, 1912.
1. Rule 1.08(a) (1), RSMo 1957 Supp., at 1334.
2. 297 S.W.2d 510 (Mo. 1957).
3. 300 S.W.2d 419 (Mo. 1957).
(401)
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sense and the case was transferred to the court of appeals. In Grimes v.
Armstrong4 -the court points out that ordinarily title is not involved
where there is merely a dispute over the location of a boundary line, but,
where the real controversy involves a specific strip of ground adjudicated
in the trial court by a specific finding on the issue of adverse possession,
the court reached the conclusion that title to real estate is actually
involved in the jurisdictional sense and retained'jurisdiction of the appeal.
In White v. Huffman 5 where the proceeding was a petition for redemption of real estate which had been foreclosed under the sale powers
of a deed of trust, and the issue was whether or not the owner had the
right to redeem because the sale was made to a straw party to cut off the
right of redemption, the court held that the judgment would not directly
affect the title to real estate and that the issue was merely whether or not
a statutory right of redemption exists. Pointing out that, if the right does
exist, title to real estate may or may not be affected, depending upon
whether appellants elect to exercise the right to redemption, the court
held that it was without jurisdiction of the appeal and transferred it to the
court of appeals.
In City of St. Charles v. De Sherlia6 the court held that, although
ordinarily an ejectment suit involves only the right of possession and not
title to real estate in the jurisdictional sense, under the state of the
pleadings and after judgment proceedings in that case the recognized
exception to the general rule as to jurisdiction of ejectment actions where
the defendant puts the title in issue was not available to vest jurisdiction
in the supreme court. In that case plaintiff's suit was in ejectment and
defendants filed their answer denying plaintiff's right of possession and
alleging that they had been in adverse possession of the land for more
than ten years. By the prayer of their answer they only asked that they
be dismissed with their costs. They also filed what was termed a "cross
action"'7 but which was in fact a counterclaim in which they again
asserted title by adverse possession and asked that the court by its decree
determine that title and quiet defendant's title as against the claim of
plaintiff. The trial on the issues of ejectment was before a jury and on
the issues presented by the counterclaim was to the court. The jury

4.
5.
6.
7.

304 S.W.2d 793 (Mo. 1957).
301 S.W.2d 824 (Mo. 1957).
303 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. 1957).
Id. at 33.
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returned a verdict against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendants in
the ejectment suit. The court, in entering judgment on the verdict, also
included in the judgment a finding of the issues on the counterclaim
against defendants. Defendants filed no after-trial motions and took no
appeal from the judgment on the counterclaim. However, on plaintiff's
motion for new trial the judgment on the suit in ejectment was set aside
by the action of the court in sustaining plaintiff's motion for new trial on
the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and
that instructions given at the request of defendants were erroneous.
Defendants then appealed from the judgment and order granting a new
trial. The court held that by the adjudication of the counterclaim from
which no appeal was taken, the issues and the relief sought by the
counterclaim are no longer in the case; and, because the judgment in the
ejectment action was limited to the right of possession, title to real estate
was not involved in the appeal and the case was transferred to the court
of appeals.
The monetary limitations upon appellate jurisdiction have not been
8
too troublesome during the year under review. In Powers v. Johnson
the case was transferred to the court of appeals because the appeal involved only the issue of control of certain perpetual care funds of a
cemetery rather than permanent divestiture of title of those funds and
the value of that control was not affirmatively shown.

In Engel Sheet Metal Equip. Inc. v. Shewman,9 the suit was for an
injunction and an accounting in a trademark infringement matter. The
court entered a decree enjoining defendants from infringing and appointed
a master to hold hearings on the accounting feature of the case. From an
order overruling motions for new trial the appeal was taken even though
there had been no accounting by the master or judgment entered upon an
accounting for damages. The court held that there was no affirmative
showing of a jurisdictional amount to vest jurisdiction in the supreme
court and, because of that fact it could not determine whether or not the
appeal was premature. Transfer to the court of appeals followed.
In Hemphifl v. Jackson' 0 it is again emphasized that the jurisdictional
amount must be affirmatively shown by competent evidence in the record.

8. 302 S.W.2d 899 (Mo. 1957).
9. 298 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. 1957).
10. 304 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1957).
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That case was one for the discovery of assets consisting of certain corporate stock. Although a large amount of preferred stock of a corporation
was involVed, the court held that "the fact that the shares were redeemable by the corporation at a certain price has no tendency whatever to
show the value of such shares of stock at any particular time."'1 Accordingly, the case was transferred to the court of appeals.
Two other cases were transferred to the courts of appeals. In State
ex rel. Kugler v. Tillatson12 the transfer was because, as the court had
repeatedly held, the directors of school district were not state officers
within the jurisdictional sense; and in Jones Motor Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n 3s jurisdiction was denied because the industrial commission is
not a state officer and the employment security law is not a revenue law
in the constitutional sense.
THE

RIGHT OF APPEAL

The right of appeal is, by statute, accorded to a party "aggrieved by
any judgment" in several instances including "any order granting a new
trial.' 1 4 In Gier v.Clark15 the trial resulted in a mistrial because the
jury was unable to agree. Within ten days after the mistrial was declared
defendant filed motion for judgment in accordance with his prior motion
for directed verdict. That motion was overruled and he appealed. His
notice of appeal stated that he had appealed "from the Order and Final
Judgment Overruling Defendant's 'Motion for Judgment in Accordance
with Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict Made at the Close of All
of the Evidence', the jury not having returned a verdict."'0 The court,
by its opinion, points out that the provisions of section 510.29017 providing
for motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, if a verdict is not
returned, for judgment in accordance with a prior motion for directed
verdict, are not sufficient to create a right of appeal. The court points out
that there was no trial court order granting a new trial and therefore
defendant did not appeal from any order granting a new trial; that the
overruling of the motion for judgment in accordance with the prior

31. Id. at 8.
12.
13.

300 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. 1957).
298 S.W.2d 407 (Mo. 1957).

14.
15.
16.
17.

§ 512.020, RSMo 1949.
300 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. 1957).
Id. at 520.
RSMo 1949.
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motion for directed verdict did not constitute a final judgment; that, even
if there should be merit to the contention that the action of the court had
the effect of granting a new trial to the plaintiff, that action was the
result of defendant's motion for judgment and thus at defendant's request;
and that defendant was not a party aggrieved by the action and could not
appeal. The appeal was dismissed as premature.
In State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Smith18 a condemnation
proceeding resulted in the taking of lands of defendant. Machinery and
equipment were in a building erected thereon. An order was entered by
the court finding the machinery and equipment to be personal property,
not subject to condemnation and it was from that order that the appeal
was prosecuted. The court held that the motion raising the issue as to
the machinery and equipment was not an original and independent
proceeding but was only an incidental step in the condemnation proceeding and that the decision thereof did not dispose of the entire claim. Holding that claims are not reviewable on a piecemeal basis the appeal was
dismuissed as premature.
Similarly in Anderson v. Metcalf,19 a suit to have a certain deed set
aside and for an accounting for the rental value of the property involved,
the court held that a finding that the deed should be set aside and that
plaintiffs were entitled to the accounting for the rents and referring the
case to a master for an accounting was interlocutory in character and did
not dispose of all of the parties and all of the issues in the case. The court
regarded the issue as similar to and controlled by its decision in Adams v.
Adams2 0 which was reviewed last year 2 ' and dismissed the appeal as
premature.
In Hahn v. Hahn,22 plaintiff brought a partition suit against his
former wife involving residence property formerly owned by them while
they were married. By cross-petition the wife sought to have an equitable
lien imposed upon her former husband's interest in the property on the
theory that she had made payments of principal and interest on a deed of
trust. The issues in the partition suit were not contested and the hearing

18.

303 S.W2d 120 (Mo. 1957).

19. 300 S.W.2d 377 (Mo. 1957).
20. 294 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. 1956).
21. Garnett, The Work of the Supreme Court for the year 1956-Appqllate Practice, 22 Mo. L. RBv.339, 341 (1957).
22. 297 S.W.2d 559 (Mo. 1957) (en banc).
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was on the cross-action only resulting in a judgment adverse to the
defendant. Her appeal was dismissed by the Kansas City Court of
Appeals as premature 23 and, because of that holding, the supreme court
granted the defendant's application to transfer the appeal to the latter
court. The court of appeals had raised and decided the prematurity of the
appeal on its own motion. The supreme court comments that courts
should avoid the disposition of appellate cases on procedural grounds,
and analyses the question of whether or not a separate judgment as to a
part of the case is interlocutory and to be stayed until all other final
judgments have been entered or is an order for a separate judgment
within the meaning of supreme court rule 3.29.24 Pointing to the fact that,
since the right of partition was not contested, the cross-petition involving
the wife's equitable lien on the husband's interest was the only live issue
in the case, the court held the decision of that issue constituted a final
judgment for the purposes of appeal.
REcoRDs

AND BRIEFS

In Taney County v. Addington2 5 the appellant filed a transcript
which had not been signed or consented to by the attorneys for plaintiff
or for defendant, nor presented to, signed, settled or approved in any
manner by the trial court. Pointing to the fact that if the parties have
agreed the transcript is correct it need not be approved by the trial court
but if there is no such agreement the statute requires its approval by the
trial court, it was held that where neither of these two methods of verification of the transcript have been followed, the appeal must be dismissed. The court did, however, review the record and determine ex
gratiathat there was no merit in the appeal.
In Jacobs v. Stone26 the appeal was dismissed for insufficiency of
appellant's brief. Its insufficiencies were numerous. It contained no
statement of facts actually relevant to any question or questions for
determination, its statement of the points relied upon consisted of allegations of error of the trial court in sustaining the motion for directed verdict and instructing the jury that the verdict should be for the defendants
without any concise statement of why it was contended that the trial

23.
24.
25.
26.

287 S.W.2d 337 (K.C. Ct. App. 1956).
RSMo 1957 Supp., at 1340.
304 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. 1957).
299 S.W.2d 439 (Mo. 1957).
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court was wrong in so ruling. In the section of the brief devoted to argument these abstract statements of the law were merely repeated and there
was no effort to show the court in what way any particular fact was overlooked or misconstrued by the trial court. In addition, the statement of
facts was devoid of any specific page reference to the transcript. Pointing
to the fact that the rule with respect to the contents of appellant's brief is
not observed by a mere show of surface routine but requires a painstaking analysis of meritorious contentions and is for the benefit of both
the appellate court and counsel, the court held that the brief really
presented nothing for review and dismissed the appeal on that ground.
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